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Abstract 
In normal child development, both individual and group 
pretense first emerges at approximately two years of age. The 
metarepresentational account of pretense holds that children 
already have the concept PRETEND when they first engage in 
early group pretense. A behavioristic account suggests that 
early group pretense is analogous to early beliefs or desires 
and thus require no mental state concepts.  I argue that a 
behavioral account does not explain the actual behavior 
observed in children and it cannot explain how children come 
to understand that a specific action is one of pretense versus 
one of belief. I conclude that a mentalistic explanation of 
pretense best explains the behavior under consideration. 
Introduction 
In this paper I compare two cognitive accounts of 
pretense: the meta-representational view of Alan Leslie 
(1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1994, 2002) and the behavioral 
boxology account of Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich 
(2000, 2003) (henceforth represented in the text as ‘N&S’).  
More specifically, I contrast the arguments of each theory in 
explaining very early group pretense. The paper is 
structured into several sections.  Section one outlines key 
facts about early pretense that both accounts agree upon and 
briefly summarize the cognitive accounts offered by these 
two perspectives. Section two focuses on the major point of 
disagreement between the two accounts; i.e., whether early 
group pretense is essentially mentalistic. In this section I 
articulate the three arguments presented by N&S against a 
mentalistic explanation of early pretense and provide 
reasons why these criticisms fail. Section three examines 
develops my critique of the behavioristic model of pretense 
offered by N&S. Finally I conclude the best explanation of 
early pretend behavior is that it is the product of conceptual 
thinking. 
Some Facts About Pretense 
Pretend behavior first occurs around two years of age. At 
this time a child can be observed pretending to themselves 
that some aspect of reality is different to what it actually is.  
For example, a child might feed pretend food to their doll or 
empty pretend dirt from their toy dump truck. At 
approximately the same age, the child can participate in 
group pretense activities. For example, if mother pretends 
that a banana is a telephone, then the child will effortlessly 
join in the pretense. Both Leslie and N&S are interested in 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms of pretense and the 
information processing tasks these mechanisms have to 
perform (Leslie 1987a; N&S, 2003). Both theories agree 
that in order to avoid ‘representational abuse’1, true beliefs 
must be kept functionally separate from pretend mental 
contents.  So, the child who pretends that the banana is a 
telephone must be able to keep the true properties of the 
banana (e.g. edible) separate from the fictional ones (e.g. 
communication device). Both Leslie and N&S agree that if a 
child could not keep these properties distinct, then they 
would suffer from terrible conceptual confusion.  
In Leslie’s account, the way contents of pretend beliefs 
are isolated from actual beliefs is by being ‘decoupled’ into 
a metarepresentation.  Decoupling effectively gives 
otherwise transparent mental contents—e.g.  the cup is 
empty—into opaque ones—e.g. “the cup is empty”.  By 
making the content of pretend representations opaque; the 
reference, truth and existence conditions can be 
semantically segregated from primary representational 
meaning. Leslie suggests that mental representations 
underlying pretense have the form: I PRETEND2   ‘this empty 
cup contains tea’ (1987a, 420). Thus Leslie’s account 
essentially involves an intentional agent (e.g. the child or the 
mother), an informational relation and the opaque content. 
Importantly, Leslie’s mentalistic account requires that the 
child has the concept PRETEND to engage in pretense. 
In N&S, semantic segregation is achieved via the possible 
world box (PWB). In the PWB, the entire contents of the 
belief box are downloaded and then specific beliefs are 
altered to fulfill the requirements of the pretend task. So, in 
the case when a child is pretending that an empty cup 
contains tea, she alters a belief in the PWB from the true 
belief ‘this cup is empty’ to ‘this [empty] cup contains tea’ 
(2003, 51). In N&S’s account, early pretense functions like 
any other propositional attitude like belief or desire.  An act 
of pretense is merely “behaving in a way that would be 
appropriate if p were the case” (2003, 53). On this theory, a 
child (or non-human primates) can engage in acts of 
pretense without having conceptual knowledge of them as 
pretense.  Thus, the crucial difference between the two 
accounts of early pretense is that Leslie’s is mentalistic, 
whilst N&S is behavioristic. 
                                                          
1 The description ‘representation abuse’ was introduced by Leslie 
(1987) to indicate the risk to the reference, truth and existence 
relations of veridical mental content during an act of pretense.   
2 In this paper capitals are used to indicate concepts, as opposed to 
simply propositional attitudes.  Thus, BELIEF is ‘the concept of 
belief’.  Where as ‘belief’ is simply the propositional attitude of 
belief.  The difference is important because very young children 
could plausibly have beliefs as functional propositions influencing 
their behavior before they come to have BELIEF. 
Is Pretending Essentially Mentalistic? 
Leslie’s mentalistic account depends upon three major 
arguments3: The simultaneous development of individual 
and group pretense, the parallels between pretense and 
mental state expressions and the fact that autistic children 
are both poor at mindreading and pretense. In this section I 
will articulate these arguments. 
The Simultaneous Development of Individual and 
Group Pretense 
One of the intriguing aspects of pretend behavior is that 
there is very little time between the first time a child 
pretends during solo play and the first time they engage in 
pretense behavior with other people. Leslie (2002) argues 
that because the abilities for individual and group pretense 
develop at the same age and because group pretense requires 
understanding other people’s mental states, then the 
parsimonious explanation of all pretense is that it is 
essentially mentalistic. N&S reply that a behavioristic 
explanation of early group pretense has not been ruled out 
by Leslie and indeed cite evidence to the contrary. N&S’s 
argue that: 
 
“In order to engage in the banana/telephone pretense, the child 
must understand that Momma is behaving in a way that would 
be appropriate if the banana were a telephone.  But as several 
researchers have noted, the child need not have a mentalistic 
understanding of pretense. (Harris 1994b: 250-1; Jarrold et al. 
1994: 457; Lillard 1996: 1,718.” (N&S, 2003, p.53) 
 
The behavioristic explanation of a mother pretending that 
a banana is a telephone is that: the child understands that 
mother is behaving in a way that would be appropriate if the 
banana were a telephone (N&S, 53). The child upon 
perceiving this event takes her belief ‘this is a banana’ and 
updates the contents of her PWB with the content ‘this 
[banana] is a telephone’ retaining all other beliefs as they 
were. N&S claim that a child’s motivation to engage in 
pretense, “derives from a real desire to act in a way that fits 
the description being constructed in the PWB” (p.59). That 
is, the child impetus is a desire to act consistently with a 
constructed scenario. If this behavioristic account of 
pretense is right, then it reduces the attractiveness to posit 
theory of mind to early pretend behavior, thus undermining 
Leslie’s project.  
However, in the next section I argue that N&S’s 
behavioristic solution does not explain early pretense. I have 
two major criticisms of N&S.  1) That a behavioristic 
explanation does not explain how a child comes to 
understand that specific behaviors indicate a pretense 
episode and 2) it is not a necessary part of pretending that a 
child must desire to act in a way that would be appropriate if 
the pretense were true. 
 
                                                          
3 The analysis of Leslie’s view into these three major arguments 
originates in N&S (2003).  I have kept this structure both because I 
agree that it does indeed mirror the arguments of Leslie and 
because it clearly shows how N&S disagree with Leslie’s position. 
Why a behavioristic explanation does not explain how a 
child comes to understand a pretense episode. 
Looking more closely at N&S suggestion, what does it 
mean to construct a scenario in the PWB based on the 
observation of action?  That is, how does a pretend scenario 
get to the PWB via behavioral cues? Using the banana case 
mentioned above—if N&S are right—then there must be 
something about mother’s actions picking up the banana and 
holding it to her ear that triggers behavioral cues about 
picking up a telephone.  
The problem with this sort of account is that a huge 
variety of actions can satisfy a single instance of pretending 
and conversely, the same action can signify a variety of 
mental activities. As Leslie states, the fact that “one and the 
same piece of behavior can, in principle, be produced under 
different internal states… makes it so extremely difficult to 
produce a watertight behavioral definition of pretense” 
(1987, 414). Another serious problem for N&S’s behavioral 
account is the impact of verbal behavior.  
Leslie (1987) points out that linguistic performance 
accompanies exaggerated gestures and other cues to signal 
pretense to the child by the mother. E.g., when a child hears 
the mother saying, ‘let’s pretend that the banana is a 
telephone’ a plausible account is that the child switches to 
conceptualizing the sequence of activities as pretense, rather 
than belief. Trying to account for Verbal behavior 
behaviorally will simply not work as Chomsky (1967) so 
savagely demonstrated to B.F. Skinner.   
In addition to this, if the child simply mimics the mother 
in her actions, thus triggering some process, then it provides 
no account for the playful divergences from the ‘script’ that 
so often accompany pretend play. This leads to my second 
point about the intentions that lie behind episodes of pretend 
play. 
 
Why it is not necessary to act in a way that “would be 
appropriate if the pretense was true”. 
Although people might pretend by acting consistently 
with a set of updated beliefs, this conception misses a 
crucial component of pretense. The real excitement of 
pretense is the flexibility to do something that is entirely 
inappropriate to the pretend episode. For example, what 
would the child do if mother picked up the banana and said, 
“Hello, is this the zoo? Could you send me an elephant 
please; we’d like to play ‘circuses’”.  Surely it is totally 
inappropriate if mother was really on the telephone to the 
zoo and asked them to deliver elephants? It is inappropriate 
behavior because, on the telephone one only asks for real 
things from people, one is not allowed to say anything they 
like.  Yet, if mother did ask for elephants, would the child 
be confused?  Would this ‘inappropriate behavior’ of 
mother doom the entire pretense episode? Of course not!  
The child would most likely start giggling and probably ask 
for some monkeys too!   
A large proportion of the fun of pretense is found in 
acting in ways that can be completely unlike the appropriate 
behavior. Also consider that not only did the mother violate 
rules of etiquette here, but she violated the physical 
requirements of the task by not even dialing any telephone 
number.  That is, mother simply picked up the ‘phone’ and 
suddenly the zoo answered.  This is not only inappropriate, 
it is totally inaccurate phone-pretense if pretense is all about 
behavior and not about the intention behind the behavior.  
Perhaps N&S would respond to this criticism by saying 
that the child quickly updates more beliefs into the PWB as 
the pretense continues, so that new contents like ‘to talk to 
someone on the telephone, you don’t need to dial any 
number’ and ‘when on the telephone to the zoo, you can ask 
for elephants’.  But, this explanation seems to be clutching 
at straws. If a child did ask for monkeys, then how does 
updating the PWB with the statement, ‘when on the 
telephone to the zoo, you can ask for elephants’ explain the 
child’s behavior?  If the child can generalize from 
requesting elephants, to requesting all animals, doesn’t that 
show that the child is thinking about the situation?  
It looks as though the child is engaging in conceptual, 
mentalistic processes. The behavioral explanation of group 
pretense fails because it does not and cannot explain what it 
purports to explain: which is how children can understand 
what is going on when someone other than themselves 
begins pretending. I will say more about this in section 
three. 
The Parallels Between Pretense and Mental State 
Expressions 
One of Leslie’s arguments to support his decoupling 
account of pretense is that the semantic properties of 
‘pretend’ parallel the semantic properties of other mental 
state expressions.  N&S argue that Leslie is making the 
wrong connection. They argue that instead of making a 
parallel between pretending and other conceptualized 
mental state expressions, the correct comparison for 
‘pretend’ is with other propositional attitudes such as 
‘belief’ and ‘desire’.  N&S go on to say that because beliefs 
and desires can be held without conceptual understanding, it 
is inconsistent to make pretense conceptual.  Because 
beliefs and desires can be nonconceptual, N&S imply that 
other propositional attitudes, like pretend, must also be 
nonconceptual. Must we agree with N&S that most or all 
propositional attitudes have the same properties as belief 
and desire?  
It is true that out of all the propositional attitudes, 
evidence for belief and desire in non-humans is the 
strongest because we can observe behavior that would be 
consistent with fulfilling such attitudes.  For example, if we 
observe an ape pushing his arm through the bars of a cage 
towards a banana, the behavior is consistent with desiring 
food. Plus, the fact that the ape is pushing his arm at the 
precise point closest to food is consistent with him believing 
that there is food there.  As N&S articulate, these animals 
could have “lots of beliefs and desires though they are 
entirely incapable of conceptualizing mental states” (2003, 
52). Whilst the case for belief and desire seems convincing, 
how many other propositional attitudes would it be 
reasonable to consider affecting the actions of non-humans?  
Could we say with conviction that an ape imagines?  
Probably not.  Why? Because there is no behavioral cues 
which could inform us and we have no way of mindreading 
what an ape is thinking.  I am not alone in thinking this (see 
Yablo, 1993; Walton, 1990). Walton says succinctly: 
 
It is not easy to see what behavioral criteria might throw light on 
imagining, or what the relevant functions of a functional account 
might be.  Imagining seems less tractable than more frequently 
discussed attitudes such as believing, intending, and desiring as 
well as emotional states such as being happy or sad or feeling 
guilty or jealous. (21) 
 
Walton suggests that important differences exist between 
mental states with behavioral indicators such as emotional 
states versus deeply introspective states with little or no 
external markers such as imagining. As Nagel (1974) has 
taught us, there is no way for us to know what it is like to be 
a bat, nor a rat or an ape. So, the best we can do is to 
observe the behavior of animals and make suppositions.  
Because of this restriction, there are lots of propositional 
attitudes that we must remain agnostic about when it comes 
to animals or pre-verbal children.  Hoping, dreaming, 
imagining, forgetting, expecting and thinking all exhibit few 
behavioral cues. Plus, the cues that we can see easily 
describe a variety of mental states, so it is nigh impossible 
to determine whether an individual incapable of 
communication has them or not. What about pretense? 
Pretending is one of the few propositional attitudes which 
does have behavioral cues. Perhaps ‘pretend’ is more like 
‘belief’ and less like ‘think’ or ‘hope’.  
However, does having behavioral cues entail that pretense 
functions in the same way as belief and desire? The fact that 
non-human primates do not seem to engage in pretense is a 
reason to think that pretense requires a different sort of 
architecture than belief and desire. In fact, one plausible 
reason that non-humans do not pretend is because they lack 
the necessary conceptual capacity. Also, when we consider 
young children, it is important to recognize the fact that 
simply because a young child who is pretending may not be 
able to discuss the pretense indicates nothing about their 
conceptual abilities and everything about their linguistic 
skills.  The distinction between concept acquisition and 
language acquisition must not be conflated.  
Finally, many propositional attitudes such as regretting or 
hoping require conceptual apparatus. Therefore, whatever 
the parallels between propositional attitudes, N&S provide 
no argument against some requiring conceptual knowledge 
and some that do not. Without this parallel, then N&S’s 
criticism has nothing to contribute against Leslie’s account. 
Autistic Children are Poor at both Mindreading 
and Pretense 
The third of Leslie’s arguments is that a theory of mind 
explanation is the best way to explain the curious fact about 
autistic children that they neither engage in pretense, nor 
seem to understand the mental states of others. Thus, if the 
child does not have the decoupling mechanism responsible 
for metarepresentation, then they will fail any task requiring 
the understanding of mental states. N&S argue that rather 
than a specific theory of mind failure, autistic symptoms are 
explained by a failure of the mechanism which puts 
representations into the PWB.  
Yet, experiments have shown that autistics can complete 
other tasks that require correctly putting representations into 
the PWB. A good example of this is their success at 
counterfactual reasoning. Leslie & Thaiss (1992) gave 
autistic children a version of the false-belief task which used 
photographs instead of mental state descriptions.  Autistic 
children are very successful at tasks that involve holding 
simultaneous and contradictory contents about 
nonintentional subject material. Therefore, the autistic 
deficit lies squarely with tasks involving intentionality, i.e. 
theory of mind tasks.  This is a problem for N&S’s account 
because they make no accommodation for what is different 
between intentional and non-intentional possible world 
thinking, at least at the very early stage of development we 
are discussing. 
In this section I have gone through the criticisms leveled 
at Leslie’s theory by N&S.  They have three major concerns 
and I have shown how none of these invalidate Leslie’s 
hypothesis. 1) N&S’s behavioristic account of pretense does 
not adequately explain early group pretense.  2) The fact 
that pretense is essentially conceptual is not impacted by the 
nonconceptual nature of belief or desire and 3) the PWB 
provides a poor substitute as an explanation of autistic 
cognitive deficits.  In the next section I will elaborate on 
how a behavioristic account of pretense fails to explain early 
group pretense. 
Problems with a Behavioristic Account of 
Pretense 
Nichols and Stich claim that pretending is ‘acting as 
though content x were true’. In their actual words, “To 
pretend that p is (at least to rough first approximation) to 
behave in a way that is similar to the way one would (or 
might) behave if p were the case” (2003, p.37). How exactly 
does this formulation explain the difference between 
pretense and any other behavior? Unfortunately this 
definition fails because it is the same explanation that 
underlies belief. That is, ‘to believe that p is to behave in a 
way that is similar to the way one would behave if p were 
the case’. More seriously, the behavioral consequences of 
belief entail ‘acting as though content x were true’. For 
example, if I believe that there is milk in the cup, then I’ll 
drink it, or offer it to someone else. In other words, I’ll 
behave in a way that is similar to the way one would behave 
if milk is in the cup.   
Not only does N&S’s definition not distinguish between 
pretending and belief, but it is also too weak to really 
explain the behavior in question. As Leslie (1987) discusses, 
acts of pretense are observable via the exaggerated gestures 
of the pretender. For example, If Sally is pretending that this 
cup has milk in it, then, when she pretends to drink from the 
cup, she does not put the cup to her lips, instead she tips the 
cup just before it reaches her mouth.  If she behaved 
similarly to this when holding a real drink, she would end 
up pouring the fluid down the front of her clothes.  So, 
pretend behavior itself is importantly different from 
behavior elicited from belief. Nichols and Stich seem to be 
missing the fact that belief and pretense are not merely 
behavioral outcomes, they are very different mental states.   
This difference can be made clearer with an example: 
Imagine the difference between circumstances where a 
teddy bear can talk versus one where a child pretends that 
her teddy-bear can talk. In the former, a child would listen 
silently as Teddy spoke (one toy in the 80s famously said 
“Hi! I'm Teddy Ruxpin. Do you want to hear a story”). In 
the latter condition, a child would not ‘listen’ silently to 
imaginary speaking and then respond as she would do in the 
former situation.  No, during pretense, the child talks for 
teddy and then replies to teddy’s questions.  If pretense 
really involved ‘acting as though content x were true’, then 
she would not speak for teddy, because she is pretending 
that teddy can speak for himself.  Therefore, N&S’s 
behavioral explanation of pretense fails to explain the facts 
about pretend behavior. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have evaluated the criticisms leveled 
against Leslie’s conceptual account of pretense by N&S. 
N&S suggest that a behavioral account of early group 
pretense is preferable to a conceptual account because it can 
do the work without superfluous mental baggage. N&S 
claim that early pretense it is simply a propositional attitude, 
like belief or desire.  They also suggest that autistic deficits 
can be better explained with their behavioristic boxology 
account, rather than by recourse to discussion about theory 
of mind.  I have argued that a behavioral account is 
untenable because it does not explain the actual behavior 
observed in children and it cannot explain how children 
come to understand that a specific action is one of pretense 
versus belief.  I have argued that propositional attitudes 
have a variety of properties, do not always have behavioral 
cues to indicate their satisfaction conditions and may 
necessitate conceptual apparatus. Finally, I have shown that 
N&S’s account does not explain the finding that autistics 
can think counterfactually when it involves nonintentional 
agents.  I conclude that a mentalistic explanation of pretense 
best explains the behavior under consideration. 
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